What Kiir has to do for South Sudan unity

What Kiir has to do for South Sudan unity
Saturday 26 November 2005 00:52.

Nov 22, 2005 — I am personally greateful to H.E. Salva Kiir for keeping his words. He promised me over phone when I talked to him in Washington that he would seek to resume dialogue with South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) as soon as he returned to Khartoum. It’s now obvious that he will stick to his promise when he contacted SSDF leadership in Khartoum on Nov, 22, 2005. However, I am writing this piece of article to inform him publicly about the things he has to do to achieve South Sudan unity. If I want to advise him privately, I would just call him via his cellular phone. But I want the South Sudan public to know the issues I want to convey to him. Before doing so, I want to clear the air poisoned by Garang’s loyalists, who attack respected elder Bona Malwal of wrong doing. First of all, Bona Malwal is not to blame for the formation of South Sudan government which resulted in the exclusion of the Nuer. Some folks want us to believe that Bona has something to do with it. Bona Malwal is not a member of the SPLM. He is the member of South Sudan Democratic Forum. He is an advisor to President Bashir in his capacity as a member of the Democratic Forum. If he has any relationship with Salva Kiir, it is on personal basis, not political.
The formation of the government of the South, if one may talk to Riek Machar, has nothing to do with Bona Malwal. The government was designed by what is now knowned as "the Gogrial kitchen cabinet". Bona Malwal is not a member of that shadow government. That kitchen cabinet is composed of self-appointed advisors of Salva Kiir, who happened to be the architech of the formation of the government.Those individuals are the remnants of Abel Alier’s government of Anya-Nya one. Some people may call them tribalists. Others may regard them as "old school thinkers" to borrow the words of late Dr. Garang, who categorically considered the Abel Alier’s government politicians as "the Southern Bourgeosie clique".
The question one may ask is: Why did the self-appointed advisors form the government of the South with the approval of Salva Kiir? The answer is what constitutes the reason for writing this article. First of all, factional politics within SPLM party needs to be explored before we talk about South Sudan politics in general. Before the death of Garang, SPLM was divided into those who supported Salva Kiir to get rid of Garang and those who supported the latter. The so-called SPLA young officers, who were former Garang’s personall bodyguards, plus some financially desperate individuals, supported Garang. Kiir’s group, composed of mostly polticians from Bhar El Ghazal, who were marginalized by Garang, called for removal of Garang to restructure the South Sudan politics. People need to refer to what is known as "The Rumbek Emergency Meeting" of 2004 to refresh their memory about the cleavages within SPLM.
The death of Garang without bloodshed in the South is a gift from God not only to Kiir’s group but also to South Sudan Democratic Forum, SSDF and other political groups who saw Garang as an obstacle to South-South dialogue. As the International Crisis Group expert says, "the death of Garang will make a lot of things easier because he was an arrogant dictator who cannot differentiate fact from fiction". Indeed, the demise of Garang from South Sudan political scene must be regarded as one of the turning points in history that will bring about fraternity, unity and forgiveness among South Sudanese. If John Garang did not die on July 30, there would have been civil war in the South on August 1st. The SSDF military leadership ordered all its officers to go to their units on July 28 and be prepared for war. As somebody who has high level contact with SSDF, I know nothing would have prevented Southerners from war. But because God of South Sudan does not want people to die after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, he decided to take Garang alone.
The formation of the government of national unity revealed divisions within SPLM. Garang’s loyalists who were supposed to occupy important positions in the North were purged. Nhial Deng Nhial was replaced with Dr. Lam Akol. As some analysts correctly said, "Dr. Garang is not happy in the grave for the appointment of Lam Akol as the Foreign Minister". Of course, only God knows what position Lam Akol would get if Garang were alive. But Lam became Foreign Minister because of his loyalty to Salva Kiir against Garang in 2004.
The formation of South Sudan government that led to marginalization of SSDF and certain ethnic groups within the SPLM was a compromise between Garang’s loyalists and Salva Kiir’s. Elders like Abel Alier approached "the Gogrial kitchen cabinet" and convinced them to prioritise the unity of SPLM. Prioritization of the unity of the SPLM means rejection of the demands of the SSDF and other political groups. Before the formation of the GOSS, Salva Kiir himself promised SSDF to have two ministers in the government. All his promises were rejected by the shadow cabinet. The only party that got one full ministerial post is Democratic Forum. The "Gogrial kitchen cabinet" formed the government without regard to the CPA, which clearly states that SPLM would get 70%, NCP 15% and other South Sudan parties 15%. From South Sudan parties, only the Democratic Forum has a position within the cabinet. Parties like USAP, SANU and Labour have been marginalized. It is ironic because USAP and SANU have two ministerial positions in the government of national unity, but not in the South. That is a clear violation of the CPA. When I asked Salva Kiir to explain the contradiction, he was unable to convince me at all. However, the bottom line is that Salva was defeated by his self-appointed advisors who were backed up by Abel Alier and Bor group. One may infer from logic of the game that the GOSS formed is a compromise between Dinka Bor and Dinka Bhar El Ghazal.
The next phase of Salva Kiir political problems is how to strike a compromise with SSDF in order to create a unified South Sudan. I will not focus much on the details of the need for a compromise with SSDF for security reasons; however, I will only deal with theories that should bring about that compromise. First of all, Salva Kiir must neutralize tribalists within the SPLM who do not want the resumption of the dialogue with SSDF. As the President of the South, his first loyalty must be towards the South, not tribe. The old school of thought in the South states that a leader must be loyalt to his tribe. But tribal loyalty is seen as a source of the failure of many states in Africa. A leader needs to develop a political culture in which he should fight his kin and kith who are enemies of the unity of the people in the state. A state is always built on principles which requires statemanship to keep it together. Abraham Lincoln gave his life to free African Americans from slavery. John F. Kenedy did the same thing by turning against white racists who wanted to maintain Jim Crow in the Southern States of America. In South Sudan context, Kiir must first go to war with Dinka tribalists before even dreaming of uniting the South. He has to purge all the Dinka tribalists in his government who are disloyalt to South-South dialogue with SSDF. He has to demonstrate in action that he is a leader of all South Sudan tribes.
The failure of Salva Kiir’s government will come from his stance to deal with tribalists within his party who are not interested in the correct way of managing ethnic pluralism, which is a central fact of political life in the South. There is school of thought which argues that the protest against marginalization of certain ethnic groups within GOSS is motivated by tribal reasons rather than the mismanagement of ethnic pluralism by "the Gogrial kitchen cabinet". But the thinkers of such a school of thought are intellectually incapacitated by their own ignorance of political reality in Africa. The discourse on conflict in Africa tends to be dominated by group grievances beneath which inter-group hatreds lurk, often traced back through history. When leaders of ethnically heterogenous state fail to manage pluralism, the result is always instability because the excluded groups resort to the use of force to express their grievances. By playing upon a sense of grievance, the excluded groups may therefore be able to get additional recruits more cheaply. In grievance theory, if one is consumed with grievance against the government, one may well prefer to rebel than to continue to suffer its continuation. There was no Union of Nuer Community in North America (UNCONA) before the formation of the government of national unity. The UNCONA was established by the Nuer in North America to bring about Nuer unity against marginalization in Sudan. Whether we like it or not, the UNCONA is a force that needs attention from South Sudan politicians. If the Nuer civil society are united against Salva Kiir’s government, Nuer politicians like Dr. Wal Duany, Riek Machar, Gatluak Deang, John Luk, David Koak and etc will follow the will of UNCONA leading to politicization of ethnicity in the South.
It was once thought that ethnic heterogeneity facilitates state failure in Africa, while homogeneity corrolates strongly with success. The case against this argument has become considerably stronger in recent years. The ethnic mix of a country does not by itself lead to cataclysmic outcomes, but its management. Somalia and Rwanda are two of the most ethnically homogenous states in Africa. Yet they are the source of human suffering in the 1990s. By contrast, one of the most stable countries in Africa, Cameroon, is also its most ethnically and linguistically diverse. Cameroon is believed to have over 150 ethnic groups. Ethnicity has proven to be a destablising factor only when used by frustrated and insecure elites for their own end. Even though ethnicity has been a continual source of political tension in Ghana, it has not persistently polarized the polity as it has in Nigeria or Sudan.
South Africa did not have an ethnic problem until chief Buthelezi decided to fan the flames of Zulu nationalism in order to assure for himself a role in post-apartheid government. Likewise, the former Yugoslavia was one of the most multi-ethnic, stable and relatively successful states in Europe until Slobodan Milosevic sought to maintain his power base by resurrecting latent Serbian nationalism using local Bosnian Serb leaders as surrogates. The slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda was orchestrated by insecure Hutu extremists who feard that former President Juvenal Habyarimana was giving away too much to the minority Tutsis. Salva Kiir needs to know these facts because if he fails to disarm SPLM tribalists early, they will instead disarm him in the long run. It’s advisable for him to get rid of them now for the sake of peace in the South rather than allowing them to impede dialogue with SSDF. Purging extremists within the SPLM is much better than risking a civil war with SSDF.
In conclusion, the appropriate step HE Salva Kiir must take is to confront the SPLM tribalists early so that he nurtures political culture of compromise. South Sudan needs leadership which transcends tribal loyalties to bring about peace. What SSDF is asking for is its share of power like any group in Sudan. Kiir must demonstrate spirite of statemanship within the first three years of the CPA.

*The author is the Chairman of South Sudan Democratic Forum-Canada. He is also special advisor to Maj. Gen. Paulino Matip. He can be reached at gordonbuay@hotmail.com.