AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4423 OFFERED BY CONGRESSMAN PAYNE OF NEW JERSEY

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4423
OFFERED BY CONGRESSMAN PAYNE OF NEW JERSEY SECTION

1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ethiopia Democracy, Economic Recovery, and Human Rights Promotion Act of 2006’’.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to support good governance, free and fair elections, respect for human rights, economic development, negotiated settlement of conflicts, a truly inclusive and democratic process, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, and the fight against extremism and terrorism. It is also the policy of the United States to work toward strengthening relations between the United States and Ethiopia based on the stated policy objectives of the preceding sentence and mutual security interests of our respective countries.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following: (1) The people of Ethiopia have suffered for decades due to military conflicts, natural disasters, poverty and diseases, regional instability, and the brutal dictatorship of the military junta under Mengistu Hailemariam. Tens of thousands of civilians were brutally murdered by the Mengistu regime, including women and children. Many more sacrificed their lives fighting for freedom, respect for human rights, and to bring an end to the brutal dictatorship of the Mengistu regime. (2) In May 1991, the brutal dictatorship of the Mengistu regime came to an abrupt end when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) defeated the Mengistu army, forcing the dictator to flee to Zimbabwe where he currently resides. The ouster of the Mengistu regime was not solely due to EPRDF’s military campaign but also to the decades of liberation struggle against the regime by a number of other groups and ordinary Ethiopians. (3) The EPRDF and a coalition of other political groups established a transitional government in July 1991. A number of liberation movements joined the transitional government in a spirit of a new start and the building of a democratic Ethiopia. These groups included the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and many others. (4) The OLF and other groups were forced to leave the coalition several years later. OLF fighters, after an agreement was reached to canton them in a location agreed to by the parties, were attacked and many were killed by EPRDF forces. The OLF remains outside the political process despite many efforts at a negotiated settlement between the EPRDF government and the OLF. Many other political groups also remain outside the political process. (5) The Oromos, the majority ethnic group in Ethiopia, despite the participation of some Oromo groups, including the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) which was created by the EPRDF, remain marginalized in Ethiopia and lack effective representation in government. Other groups, including Ethiopian Somalis, feel they are in similar situations. (6) For most of the 1970s and 1980s, United States-Ethiopia relations were poor largely due to Mengistu’s anti-American posture and pro-Soviet alliance and the regime’s poor human rights record. Nonetheless, the United States Government provided the Ethiopian people much needed humanitarian aid even during the Mengistu regime. (7) The United States played key roles in the post-Mengistu era in Ethiopia, although the United States did not provide open political or material support for liberation movements fighting the Mengistu regime. In May 1991, the United States attempted to broker negotiations in London between the Ethiopian Government and armed groups (EPRDF/OLF/ EPLF). The talks collapsed due to military developments on the ground. (8 ) Since the EPRDF came to power in 1991, United States policy toward Ethiopia has been criticized by many observers as being too close to the EPRDF regime rather than supporting an inclusive democratic process as a whole in the country. (9) The EPRDF-led government brought relative stability to Ethiopia, despite ongoing conflicts, in some parts of the country. Overall human rights conditions compared to the military junta are much better, although serious human rights abuses continue to occur throughout the country. (10) Congress continues to play key roles in the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, reconciliation efforts, and an end to unnecessary armed conflicts in Ethiopia. In 1994*95, the Congressional Task Force on Ethiopia brokered the first and only negotiations between the opposition and the EPRDF led-government in Washington D.C. with the support of the Department of State. Participants included the EPRDF, OLF, and several current members of the CUD and UEDF coalitions. Congress also played key roles in efforts to ensure international observer participation, access to the media for opposition candidates, and on several issues related to the May 2005 elections.

SEC. 4. STRENGTHENING HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA.
(a) FINDINGS.
*Congress finds the following: (1) Human rights conditions deteriorated significantly after the May 15, 2005, elections in Ethiopia and overall human rights conditions in the country remain poor. The Department of State, in its 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, noted a myriad of human rights abuses by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. According to the same report, ‘‘after the May elections, serious human rights abuses occurred, when the opposition parties refused to accept the announced results, and in November after the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) called for civil disobedience, which resulted in widespread riots and excessive use of force by the police and military’’. (2) In June 2005, more than 35 demonstrators were killed by Ethiopian government security personnel and in November 2005 an estimated 53 people were killed, including 7 policemen, according to Human Rights Watch and several other reports. The violence against these victims occurred after pro-opposition groups went to the streets of the capital to protest government actions in handling the elections results of May 2005. Tens of thousands of people suspected of being opposition supporters were detained over the past months, although many of these detainees were released. (3) An estimated 112 political leaders, human rights activists, community leaders, and journalists, including the chairman of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (Haile Shawel), the newly elected Mayor of Addis Ababa (Berhanu Nega), and the founder of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam), are currently in prison charged with treason and genocide. (4) Moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, ‘‘[I]n the wake of the May 15 parliamentary elections, in which opposition parties won an unprecedented number of seats amidst massive controversy over the election results, federal police in the Oromia and Amhara regions have threatened, beaten and detained opposition supporters, students and people with no political affiliation, often in nighttime raids. Alongside local government officials and members of local government-backed militias, the federal police have taken the lead in intimidating and coercing opposition supporters.’’. (5) Independent media is pivotal to good governance and respect for human rights. Mass media, including television and radio, is controlled by the Government of Ethiopia. Despite many efforts from within and outside, the licensing process has been enormously cumbersome and often difficult to obtain, although two licenses for radio were recently issued. (6) Journalists and editors of the independent Press have been and continue to face harassment and prosecution for alleged violations of press laws in Ethiopia. Dozens of journalists have either fled the country and some are currently in exile fearing prosecution or harassment. Over a dozen journalists are reportedly in prison. Moreover, among those journalists indicted for reporting on post election protests five were Ethiopian born broadcasters of the Voice of America.s Horn of Africa Service. In late March 2006, charges against these journalists and 13 others were dropped. (7) According to a March 2006 Department of State report, ‘‘Foreign journalists continued to operate freely and often wrote articles critical of government policies. Government officials often granted foreign journalists or local stringers greater access to government than local independent journalists received. However, prior to the May 15 national elections, some international correspondents reported strong government pressure to self-censor their coverage; they refused to do so, but suffered no immediate consequences.’’.
(b) CREATION OF VICTIMS SUPPORT NETWORK.
* The President, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall create a ‘‘Victims Support Network’’ for Ethiopia. The Network shall provide assistance to families of individuals who lost loved ones in Ethiopia, provide medical and financial support to individuals injured by Ethiopian Government security personnel, provide financial support for legal support for prisoners of conscience, and provide assistance to local groups or groups from outside of Ethiopia that are active in monitoring the status of individuals in prison and delivery of food, medicine, and other necessities.
(c) SUPPORTING INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS.
*The President, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall establish a mechanism to provide financial support to local human rights groups such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council to help strengthen human rights monitoring and regular reporting on human rights conditions throughout Ethiopia. (d) JUDICIAL WATCH NETWORK.
*The Secretary of State, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall create a ‘‘Judicial Watch Network’’ consisting of local and international groups to monitor judicial proceedings throughout Ethiopia with special focus on unnecessary government intervention on strictly judicial matters and to investigate and report ways to strengthen an independent judiciary.
(e) SUPPORT FOR FREE MEDIA.
*The Secretary of State, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall institute a program to strengthen private media in Ethiopia, provide support for training purposes, and offer technical and other types of support as necessary.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA.
(a) FINDINGS.
*Congress finds the following: (1) The assumption of power by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) significantly changed the political structure within Ethiopia and shifted political dominance among groups. One of the major changes in the country was EPRDF’s policy of ethnic federalism. The EPRDF-led government divided the country into 9 ethnic-based provinces. (2) Ethiopian opposition parties suffer from internal divisions and some groups lack clear policy objectives, in large part due to repeated government harassment, detention of political leaders, inability to freely function as a political party inside the country, unhelpful interference and dominance by some exile groups, and lack of popular support for opposition-led armed insurrections. (3) The EPRDF also faced its most serious internal divisions in the post-Mengistu era in 2001. A major split within the TPLF, the most important group within the EPRDF coalition, led to the ouster of nearly half of the Central Committee members and founding members of the TPLF. The ousted leaders remain a potential threat to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, leader of the party. Restructuring and the ouster of other leaders in the coalition also took place over the past several years. (4) Despite these challenges, the EPRDF coalition remains the dominant and best organized political party in the country. EPRDF’s dominance in the countryside is an important asset for the party since that is where most voters reside. The EPRDF also maintain tight control over the military and security. (5) Since the ouster of the Mengistu regime in 1991, the EPRDF-led government instituted a multiparty system and organized three regional and national elections and a number of local elections. The 1995 and 2000 elections were largely boycotted and judged to be neither free nor fair. Some opposition groups participated in the 2000 elections, giving them 12 seats in the 546-seat parliament. (6) The May 2005 pre-election period and the conduct of the elections were seen by observers to be transparent, competitive, and relatively free and fair, although there were a number of problems reported. More than 90 percent of registered voters participated and dozens of political parties took part in the elections. Moreover, a number of international groups observed the elections, unprecedented access to the mass media was given to the opposition, and there were a number of debates between the government and the opposition televised. (7) Members of Congress made the elections an important priority, with the goal of ensuring peaceful and transparent elections, taking some measures, including legislation calling for a peaceful, free and fair election and traveling to Ethiopia before and after the elections. (8 ) According to the Department of State, ‘‘domestic and international observers reported that polling throughout the country was generally credible, although irregularities and intimidation of voters and election observers marred polling in many areas’’. (9) The Department of State, in a press release, ‘‘[W]elcomed the conclusion of Ethiopia’s landmark parliamentary elections, the results of which were certified on September 5 and the September 15 conclusions of the Carter Center concerning the credibility of the elections. These elections stand out as a milestone in creating a new, more competitive multiparty political system in one of Africa’s largest and most important countries.’’. (10) A number of political parties and armed political groups boycotted the 2005 elections, although more opposition parties participated in that election than in any previous elections. The nonparticipant parties are largely in exile and only a few of them have a constituency base inside the country. The largest of these groups is the OLF, a group with a significant constituency among the Oromo people. (11) Over the past several years, senior officials of the OLF have repeatedly stated that they are prepared to negotiate with the government and to seek a peaceful solution. In 2005, the Government of Ethiopia also indicated that negotiations with the OLF were a possibility. The Department of State has encouraged both the OLF and the Government of Ethiopia to move in that direction. (12) Despite apparent improvement in the electoral process, preliminary election results announced by the Government of Ethiopia shortly after the May 15, 2005, elections were seen by observers as questionable. The opposition accused the government of stealing the elections and called for civil disobedience, which resulted in the killing of demonstrators and detention of opposition leaders and thousands of their followers, including 11 elected members of parliament.(13) The CUD, the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), and the ruling EPRDF reached an agreement to resolve disputed election results peacefully with the help of the National Electoral Board. The NEB investigated more than 299 complaints and later agreed to hold re-runs in 31 constituencies. In late August 2005, the NEB held reruns in the 31 constituencies as well as in all 23 constituencies in the Somali region, where elections had been postponed due to insecurity. (14) Election results show, opposition parties won 170 seats in the national parliament, a significant increase from the 12 seats they won in the last elections. Opposition parties also won the city council in Addis Ababa, giving them control over the capital. An estimated 150 members of parliament of the 170 have taken their seats. (15) Following the May 15, 2005, elections, the outgoing Ethiopian Parliament changed the rules of procedure in the national legislature. The opposition argued against these changes, calling them a deliberate effort to silence the opposition in parliament. In response to growing criticism, the Ethiopian Government agreed to establish a commission of experts from India, Canada, Germany, and the Ukraine to review the procedures and make recommendations. The commission made its recommendations in late March 2006. (16) In an effort to learn more about the killing of the demonstrators in June and November 2005, the Ethiopian Parliament also established a commission to investigate the killings. A report from the commission is expected at the end of April 2006.

(b) STRENGTHENING LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
* (1) IN GENERAL.
*The Secretary of State, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall provide assistance to strengthen local, regional, and national parliaments and government agencies in Ethiopia through training by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and other qualified groups. Support for such local, regional, and national parliaments and government agencies shall focus in areas determined to be necessary by the Secretary of State, in consultation with authorities and civil society groups. (2) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.
*The institutions specified in paragraph (1) should also continue to receive United States support in areas related to support for the electoral process, training of local groups, and election monitoring, voter registration, and other related programs in Ethiopia.
(c) SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AND TRAINING OF PEACEFUL POLITICAL GROUPS.
*The President, acting through the head of the appropriate department or agency of the Government of the United States, shall establish a program focused on reconciliation efforts between the Government of Ethiopia and peaceful political groups outside the political process for the purposes of training such groups in preparation for negotiations and participation in the political process. The program shall focus on groups such as the OLF, Somali groups, and other peaceful political groups.

SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(a) FINDINGS.
*Congress finds the following: (1) According to the Economist Intelligence Unit report of January 2006, ‘‘Ethiopia recorded read GDP growth of 8.9 percent in 2004/2005, according to official sources, owing to strong performance in agriculture (42% GDP). Farm output expanded by 12.3 percent, as food production rose while coffee exports doubled, helping to underpin a solid performance in other sectors: industry (11% of GDP) grew by 6.3 percent.’’. (2) Despite progress in some sectors, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries and poverty is still a major problem facing many Ethiopians.
(b) SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION SECTOR.
The President, acting through the Administrator of USAID, shall increase U.S. educational funds to support the education sectors, especially in rural areas of Ethiopia.
(c) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT.
*The President, acting through the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall provide technical and financial support for irrigation and better water resources management of the Nile River and other water resources.

SEC. 7. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. (a) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.
*Beginning on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall deny a visa and entry into the United States to any official of the Government of Ethiopia who was involved in giving orders to use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators, security personnel involved in the June and November 2005 shooting of demonstrators, and civilians involved in the killing of 7 policemen.
(b) WAIVER.
*The President may waive the application of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States and, prior to exercising the waiver, transmits to Congress a certification described in subsection (c). (c) CERTIFICATION.
*The certification described in this subsection is a certification transmitted by the President to Congress that contains a determination of the President that* (1) all prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia have been released; (2) the investigation of the killing of civilian protesters by Ethiopian security forces is credible, transparent, and those involved in the unlawful killing have been punished; (3) family members and others have unfettered access to visit detainees in Ethiopian prisons; (4) the rule of law and human rights are respected throughout Ethiopia; and (5) the Ethiopian judiciary is independent.

SEC. 8. REPORT.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on the implementation of this Act.

SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.
*There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act $20,000,000 for fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
(b) EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS.
*Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall be made available as follows: (1) $3,000,000 shall be made available to support the Victims Support Network under section 4(b). (2) $2,000,000 shall be made available to support indigenous human rights groups under section 4(c). (3) $3,000,000 shall be made available to support the Judicial Watch Network under section 4(d). (4) $2,000,000 shall be made available to support free media under section 4(e). (5) $5,000,000 shall be made available to support local, regional, and national parliaments and government agencies under section 5(b). (6) $5,000,000 for reconciliation efforts and training of peaceful political groups under section 5(c). (c) AVAILABILITY.
*Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.